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Between 1 and 8 February 2018, the US S&P 500 Index fell by 8.5%. 
The fall was concentrated in two days’ trading – 2 and 5 February – 
with the biggest correction since 2011 recorded on 5 February. In 
addition, implied volatility rose significantly, after a lengthy period at 
historically low levels (see Chart 1). Subsequently, stock prices have 
tended to recover and volatility has moderated, although neither 
have returned to the levels recorded before the market turmoil.
Various reports prepared by international organisations, such as 
the IMF and the ECB and the Banco de España,1 had warned of 
the risk of a sharp correction in equity prices, particularly in the 
United States. One supporting factor for that view was the strong 
appreciation of the US stock market in recent years (see Chart 2). 
Thus, between January 2012 and January 2018, the S&P  500 
Index gained 125%, compared with 72% for the EUROSTOXX 50 
Index and 35% for the FTSE 100. As a result, in the United States, 
some of the metrics generally used to measure share prices had 
moved some distance from their historical median, prompting 
concern among investors that shares were possibly overvalued 
(see Chart 3).
In this setting, one catalyst of the stock market correction in the 
United States was the publication, on 2 February, of figures that 
showed an unexpected increase in wage growth in the country in 1  See Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, November 2017.
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, Robert Shiller and Banco de España.
a Average 3-month USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD volatility.
b Metrics obtained since January 2005, taking the median of the distribution, represented by the horizontal line between the blue and red areas, as 100. The upper 
and lower limits of both areas correspond to the 75th and 25th percentiles. The end of the lines represent the minimum and maximum of the distribution. The green 
rhombi show the current levels. Last observation: 7 March 2018. Risk premium is calculated by subtracting the corresponding 10-year inflation-indexed bond yield 
from the real cost of capital of each index, obtained using a dividend discount model. Dividend yield is the dividend of the past year of index firms as a percentage 
of index capitalisation. CAPE ratio is the cyclically-adjusted price/earnings ratio. The lower the green rhombus value, the higher the overvaluation in the case of risk 
premium and dividend yield, whereas for the CAPE ratio, the higher the rhombus value the higher the overvaluation.
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January (2.9% year‑on‑year), while unemployment was at its lowest 
levels since 2000. This unexpected wage growth was interpreted as 
a sign that inflation could be heading up and, therefore, that official 
interest rates could rise faster than was previously expected. 
Indeed, the likelihood of rates rising by 75 basis points (bp) in 2018 
had already increased, even before the employment figures 
were published. The expectation that official interest rates would 
rise was also reflected in the increase of more than 30 bp in US 
10‑year sovereign bond yields in January, up to 2.85%. These 
higher sovereign yields could have prompted some investors to 
favour debt securities over equities.
There are signs that this episode of stock price correction and 
heightened volatility may have been amplified by certain market 
practices. Particularly noteworthy was the surge of 177% in 
implied volatility (in terms of the VIX Index) in just two sessions, to 
levels not seen since 2012; this was extraordinarily strong given 
the scale of the decline in share prices (see Chart 1). Exchange-
traded products (ETPs) which replicate the VIX may have 
contributed to this sharp increase. Although ETPs are moderate in 
size in aggregate terms, some of their trading practices can have 
a significant impact on price formation. Thus, given the initial 
surges in volatility at the start of the trading session on 5 February, 
investors knew that ETPs would have to buy more VIX futures, 
either to be able to replicate the index or, in the case of those that 
had wagered on low volatility, to limit their losses. Accordingly, in 
anticipation of these rebalancing effects, some market participants 
may have positioned themselves to benefit from increases in the 
VIX, triggering a more pronounced climb in this indicator as the 
session neared its close. Such strategies may in turn have caused 
a contagion effect on the spot market, owing to trading practices 
based on the negative correlation between prices on the VIX Index 
and the underlying share index. Moreover, the fall in share prices 
could also have been amplified by arbitrage strategies conducted 
by certain hedge funds, seeking to exploit the close correlation 
between the VIX and the underlying shares and derivatives. Lastly, 
the fact that several lower levels of support based on moving 
averages were crossed may have triggered sale orders in some 
algorithm‑based trading systems.
The fall in share prices on the US markets spread to other stock 
markets around the world, mainly the Asian and European markets. 
Thus, between 1 and 9 February, the euro area’s EUROSTOXX 50, 
the United Kingdom’s FTSE  100 and Spain’s IBEX  35 all fell by 
around 7%. The VSTOXX, the implied volatility index associated with 
the EUROSTOXX 50, also rose significantly, albeit more moderately 
than its US counterpart (see Chart 1). The correction occurred even 
though, in comparison with the United States, there was less 
concern that European markets could be overvalued; this is shown 
in the metrics generally used to measure share prices, which were 
close to their historical medians (see Chart  3). In any event, this 
episode demonstrates that even if European markets are not 
apparently overvalued, on the metrics analysed in this box, this does 
not protect them from stress episodes in the US markets. In the 
weeks following, share price volatility on the European markets 
tended to return to normal, although without reaching the levels seen 
before the episode in February, and stock market indexes have 
recovered slightly, albeit less so than in the United States.
Bond markets were hardly affected by the stock market turmoil 
(see Chart 4). Thus, in Europe and in the United States, corporate 
bond spreads over the corresponding sovereign bonds were 
virtually unchanged in the period. In the euro area, sovereign 
spreads widened only slightly in the first week of February. 
Likewise, bonds and exchange rates did not experience the sharp 
surge in volatility observed in the stock market indexes (see 
Chart  1). This would be consistent with the argument that the 
technical elements mentioned above played a major part in the 
stock market correction, over and above the effect associated 
with fundamentals.
